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Abstract 
 
The 12th ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) Foreign Ministers meeting will take place in Luxembourg on 5-
6 November 2015. This will be an important occasion as the 53 partners in the ASEM process prepare 
for the 20th anniversary of ASEM that will be celebrated at the Summit Meeting in Mongolia next year.  
In the run-up to the 20th anniversary summit in 2016, ASEM partners will not only take stock of the 
achievements during the past two decades but also ponder over the future direction of ASEM.  
 
This policy brief tries to address the question on how ASEM can move forward and remain relevant 
in an increasingly uncertain and volatile world. It begins by sketching some of the broad trends shap-
ing the emerging world order, and the implications for international cooperation. It argues that there 
is a need for ASEM to move beyond meetings to transform itself into a dynamic marketplace, leverag-
ing on its diverse membership and fluidity to enable the building of different constellations of trans-
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INTRODUCTION 
The world stepped into the 21st century with high 
hopes that we are entering into an era defined by 
interdependence, institutions-building and interna-
tional cooperation. There were still remnants of 
the euphoria from the immediate post-Cold War 
era that the neo-liberal economic order would be 
with us, and globalization as a driving force would 
lift millions out of poverty, and global politics 
would take place within the confines of the inter-
national institutions and global forums that have 
been put in place during the 20th century.  
However, then came 9/11, the war against terror, 
and the near economic meltdown caused by the 
global financial crisis in 2008-9. Into the second 
decade of the 21st century, we entered a world 
system marked by shifting polarity with the rise of 
China and the rest coupled by the relative decline 
of the US and the West, rising inequality and dis-
content with the existing socio-economic order 
and increasing uncertainties about our future as 
we faced a series of complex challenges brought 
about by the changing realities of power and in-
fluence driven by digital and technological revolu-
tions. What do all these portend, and can a loose 
informal dialogue forum like the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) remain useful and relevant in a 
world marked by uncertainties and volatility as 
emerging powers jostle for a place in the sun. 
 
SKETCHING THE CONTOURS OF THE 
EMERGING WORLD (DIS)ORDER 
With the end of the Cold war, we have gone from 
the prognostication of a unipolar world with US as 
the sole superpower, to hopes of a multipolar 
world with the rise of China and optimism about 
regional developments in East and Southeast 
EU Centre Policy Brief 2 
 
  
Asia, the deeper integration of the EU and its as-
pirations to be a global actor, to increasingly a 
much less certain, and far more contested analy-
sis of the kind of world (dis)order that we are 
heading into.  There are those who portend that 
we are still in a liberal order (Ikenberry, 2014) 
helmed by the US, while others who believed we 
are entering the age of entropy (Schweller, 2014). 
In between, there are the different prognostica-
tions of a G-Zero, G-2 or a polycentric world in 
which no single country will be in a hegemonic 
position, and instead of looking at a single global 
order, we should be looking at diverse regional 
orders (Khanna, 2014). 
What all these debates show is that we are clear-
ly in a period of transition, but transition to what is 
less clear and much contested.  
This period of transition has important geopolitical 
implications at the same time as we witnessed a 
number of economic and societal changes driven 
by globalization manifested in the global flows of 
trade and capital, labour and people, ideas and 
cultural memes, and at the speed and scale 
transformed by developments in the information 
and communications technology. What are some 
of these broad trends that will impact and shape 
our world in the years to come? 
Diffusion and Dilution of power 
Two main forces have been driving the 21st cen-
tury world - one is the shifting distribution of pow-
er globally through diffusion to emerging countries 
such as China and at local level from state to oth-
er non-state actors, and there is also dilution of 
power in that traditional sources of power such as 
military might are becoming less potent and less 
“usable” (Jentleson, 2014).  Hence, while the US 
remains paramount in terms of its military hard-
ware, and is still capable of acting on a global 
scale, it no longer wields the same kind of influ-
ence on the other actors. According to Bilahari 
Kausikan (2015), “the paradox of our times is that 
while only the US retains the capability for global 
leadership, there is no longer any strategic im-
perative to compel acceptance of US leadership”. 
There are also increasing questions raised by 
Americans themselves on the cost of such lead-
ership resulting in a much more ambivalent Amer-
ica (Kagan, 2014).   
The diffusion and dilution of power is not only 
happening at the global level, but conventional 
states and their governments are also finding 
their power and authority challenged and eroded 
due to the technological revolution. 
Disruptions by digital revolution 
The digital revolution of the 21st century has fur-
ther diffused and diluted traditional power struc-
tures by allowing information to spread faster and 
further empowering average citizens and corpora-
tions, but also allowing terrorists and shadowy 
transnational criminal groups greater power to 
disrupt and destroy. As noted by Schweller 
(2014), Twitter, Facebook and text messaging 
have allowed citizens to organize massive 
demonstrations and topple dictatorial govern-
ments, but the jury is still out with regards to 
whether citizens organized via social media can 
bring about genuine political and economic 
changes.  
It is not only the shift in power but the change in 
the nature of power fuelled by communication 
technologies. As Moises Naim (2013) argued, 
power is increasingly fleeting, and in fact is erod-
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ing in the sense that it is easier to get, but harder 
to use and far easier to lose. “The profound 
changes in the way power is gained, used and 
lost drive many of the trends that are changing 
the world”(Naim, 2013:40).  
Nationalism, identity politics and contestation 
of ideas and norms 
Another paradox of our 21st century world is the 
mix of integration and fragmentation – countries 
and communities being pulled together into vari-
ous webs of interconnectedness while also being 
pushed apart by various manifestations of identity 
(Jentleson, 2014).  
Together with greater doubts about the western 
model of development, many non-western coun-
tries are going back in search of ideas rooted in 
their own history, culture and identity and reject-
ing the universalism proclaimed by the West. In-
creasingly, many questions related to global re-
sponsibility, optimal norms, institutions and poli-
cies as framed by the West are being challenged. 
At the nation-state level, some governments, po-
litical parties and politicians are also resorting to 
nationalism and identity politics as a way to mobi-
lise their populations and hang on to power. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
In a world marked by increasing uncertainties, 
diversities and volatility because of the above 
trends, there is a need to rethink our approach 
towards international cooperation and global gov-
ernance. Many political leaders and analysts have 
lamented on the crisis of current global govern-
ance manifested in the lack of effectiveness in 
solving global problems, a lack of representation 
of emerging powers in existing institutions and a 
lack of democracy in multilateral policy-making.  
These have led emerging powers such as China 
to seek other alternatives and pursue their inter-
ests outside or counter to existing multilateral in-
stitutions, for example in the launch of the New 
Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB).  While the creation of 
parallel structures such as AIIB can work to cre-
ate additional capacity toward governance and 
provision of public goods, it could also result in 
circumvention or contradiction of existing struc-
tures, leading to bloc building that could result in 
renewed antagonisms and political blockades. 
Increasingly, emerging powers are challenging 
existing global institutions and multilateral forums 
over issues such as membership and representa-
tion, decision-making procedures and their nor-
mative order. These contestations have led to 
what Ruland (2012) has termed diminished multi-
lateralism, which differs markedly from the princi-
pled multilateralism that liberal institutionalists 
and constructivists saw on the rise in the first half 
of the 1990s. Diminished multilateralism is “de-
void of the cosmopolitan ideational underpin-
nings, the telos, legalism and contractualism 
characteristic of liberal conceptualization of global 
governance” and instead is based on “low intensi-
ty cooperation that resonates more with realist 
paradigm of power balancing, hedging and rela-
tive-gains orientation” (Ruland, 2012:258). 
With diminished multilateralism, the phenomenon 
of “forum shopping” has also become prevalent. 
Forum shopping is a term denoting a strategy in 
which actors pick and choose among the mecha-
nisms that best fit their individual political agenda 
(Forman and Segar, 2006).  Countries small, me-
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dium and big are all banking more on their own 
strategic initiatives than on formal alliances or 
fixed institutional relationships to defend their in-
terests and advance their goals. As interdepend-
ence grows and relations become intertwined and 
spread in more haphazard way, or becoming 
more spaghetti-like, we will see a more variable 
geometry and different coalitions and networks 
emerging. More often than not, one will see 
“loose alliances” forming over different issues. 
Alliances or more correctly, coalitions and net-
works will be far more issues and interest driven, 
and not so much ideologically-driven. Pragmatism 
and flexibility will rule the day, and the challenge 
is for countries to preserve a maximum range of 
options. This in turn requires a good grasp and 
understanding of the changes and challenges and 
practicing astute diplomacy that not only involves 
information gathering, communication and repre-
sentation, but “diplomacy organised to an ever 
growing degree around governance” and negotia-
tions to achieve certain outcomes. In this image 
of diplomacy, policy dialogue involving not only 
state actors but a range of non-state actors who 
possess the expertise and the network of re-
sources become important (GR:EEN Policy Re-
port). This also requires diplomacy to operate in 
“networked constellations, not bilateral transac-
tions” 
As power becomes more diffuse, actors other 
than states will play important governance roles. 
Subnational actors such as cities, non-state ac-
tors such as corporations and celebrities will also 
have significant impact on policies. The increas-
ing number of players needed to solve transna-
tional challenges – and their discordant values 
and interests – will complicate the decision-
making process. 
To sum up, during the current period of transition 
fraught with uncertainties, it is no longer possible 
to anticipate and foresee all the dangers and 
threats ahead. Hence, many actors on interna-
tional stage are taking measures to hedge against 
the uncertainties and competing to set the new 
rules and norms. Alternative regional or global 
platforms or architectures will proliferate and so 
will forum shopping, a strategy to cope with this 
transition. With information technology making for 
much lower barriers to entry into the international 
stage, innumerable non-governmental players are 
also making their presence felt. International poli-
tics is becoming far more erratic and unsettled 
because there is no one capable of restoring co-
herence to the global system. Hence, some politi-
cal analysts such as Parag Khanna and Bilahari 
Kausikan have suggested that “it is perhaps more 
useful to think of the future in terms of regional 
structures rather than global structures” as there 
is “no single global order, but diverse regional or-
ders”.  And with these diverse regional orders, it 
is thus perhaps more important to think of inter-
regional relations rather than international rela-
tions (Khanna, 2014).  
 
ASEM’S RELEVANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
WORLD 
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) launched in 
1996 started off as a sort of inter-regional / trans-
regional forum, with the idea of the need to build 
a stronger Asia-Europe relationship to comple-
ment the strong trans-atlantic ties and the 
strengthening trans-pacific ties. While the en-
largement of ASEM may seem to have diluted its 
inter-regional character, it may yet find a new im-
petus if it seriously re-examines how best to lev-
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erage on its current amorphous character to be-
come a useful instrument to help member states 
navigate the increasingly complex and uncertain 
world.  
From an initial partnership of 26 members com-
prising the then ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan and 
South Korea) countries on the East Asian side, 
and the EU15 and the Commission on the Euro-
pean side, it has now grown to encompass 53 
members comprising countries from the different 
sub-regions of Asia (Northeast East, Southeast 
Asia, South Asia, Australasia and Central Asia) 
and the EU28 plus non-EU European states – 
Norway and Switzerland.1  
ASEM will enter into its 20th anniversary in 2016 
and with this upcoming milestone there have 
been increased discussions and debates on the 
“usefulness” and “relevance” of ASEM.   
In the course of its developments, ASEM has 
been leveled with all sorts of criticisms, several of 
them similar to what has been leveled at other 
regional and international forums that are less 
institutionalized - that these are talk shops unable 
to address real challenges and do not bring about 
tangible benefits.  Additionally, ASEM has also 
been criticized for its lack of presence and visibil-
ity in the media and the consciousness of the 
peoples in the ASEM member states. It has also 
been seen as not open and inclusive enough and 
                                               
1 ASEM Members comprise on the European side – 28 EU 
member states (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK), 
the EU, Norway and Switzerland; and on the Asian side – 10 
ASEAN members (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Vietnam), the ASEAN Secretariat, China, Japan, Korea, 
Mongolia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, 
Australia, New Zealand and Russia. 
hence not effective in its engagement of other 
stakeholders. Despite all these criticisms, ASEM 
has continued to enlarge, and small, tentative 
steps are taken to address some of these criti-
cisms.  
However, for ASEM to continue to receive sup-
port from its members and to survive in the midst 
of a proliferation of forums and architectures, it 
must remain interesting and relevant. With the 
pluralisation of diplomacy where countries small, 
medium and large scramble to position them-
selves and defend their own interests and goals 
in an increasingly uncertain and volatile world, 
this call for a more serious re-think on its modus 
operandi and value-proposition as it approaches 
its 20th anniversary. 
Many suggestions on how to make ASEM rele-
vant in this fast-changing, volatile world have sur-
faced over the years.  Its current lack of focus, 
lack of institutionalization has often been criti-
cized, but ASEM may yet turn this amorphous 
character and fluidity into an advantage.  ASEM 
with its loose structure and very diverse member-
ship encompassing members from all spectrums 
of the political and social systems and at different 
levels of economic development can be seen as a 
microcosm of the current global system with a 
multitude of players with different interests and 
goals jockeying with one another for diplomatic 
space. Besides the official ASEM meetings and 
summits, there are also other parallel Asia-
Europe Forums that supposedly connect the 
businesses and civil society. The Asia-Europe 
Business Forum (AEBF) was also launched in 
1996, and the Asia-Europe People’s Forum 
(AEPF) also began its first meeting in Bangkok, 
back to back to the inaugural ASEM summit in 
1996.  
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ASEM has been praised by some stakeholders as 
a unique forum for establishing dialogue and con-
tacts. It fosters networking and mutual learning in 
an environment that is not “pressurizing” and 
where the “political cost” is low. But precisely also 
because of these same characteristics, commit-
ment to ASEM may not be as strong and interest 
in ASEM may decline as other forums emerged,  
or as external environment further drives attention 
away from ASEM. How then to make ASEM in-
teresting and relevant that the 53 members would 
continue to support it? 
Scientific and technological revolutions has not 
only shrunk the 21st century world, but also made 
the world “more liquid (to borrow Zygmunt Bau-
man’s term), eroding many of the structures built 
up during the industrial age – largely centred on 
the state – and replacing them with new transna-
tional networks and flows which are far more fluid 
in every sense of the word” (Ries, 2012:30).  
ASEM need therefore to transform itself from an 
Asia-Europe Meeting of senior officials, ministers 
and leaders to become a vibrant Asia-Europe 
Marketplace of multiple players, different net-
works, coming together to seek ideas, and en-
gage in “profitable” exchanges.  This Marketplace 
can also offer an avenue for members to learn, 
adapt and developed decentralized and self-
organising networks capable of responding to the 
rapidly changing environment. The issue-based 
leadership (proposed in 2006 by the researchers 
involved in the Review of ASEM in a decade)2 
                                               
2 In 2006, a group of Asian and European researchers 
coordinated by Dr Yeo Lay Hwee and Dr Bart Gaens 
respectively drafted the Report “ASEM in its Tenth Year: 
Looking Back, Looking Forward” and in this Report, they 
recommended that since ASEM is a forum of equal partners 
and decision-making is by consensus, leadership within 
ASEM must be issue-and interest-based and not power-
based. And if ASEM is to move towards more functional 
cooperation to deliver on more tangible benefits, clusters of 
would allow different constellations of players and 
the clustering of issues can allow different net-
worked constellations to operate within ASEM, 
allowing for the informalities and diversities to be-
come an asset rather than a liability.   
To make this transformation into a vibrant mar-
ketplace, the different actors currently meeting in 
parallel forums - the ASEM leaders’ summit, the 
AEBF, AEPF and the Asia-Europe Parliamentari-
ans Partnership (ASEP) meeting - need to be 
brought together under the same canopy. Within 
this market, different constellations coalesced 
around different interests (issues) but in an open 
way for players to come in as and when they are 
ready for the exchange.  
For ASEM to make the leap from a process man-
aged by senior officials to one that would em-
brace the hustle and bustle of a marketplace 
would require “champions” and policy entrepre-
neurs across the spectrum of all ASEM and other 
Asia-Europe forums to invest in the idea of 
change and transformation. Whether ASEM could 
become a “mini-Davos” 3 bringing leading actors 
from all sectors of society together or an ancient 
bazaar in the trade route linking Asia and Europe, 
all these need further intellectual exploration and 
a certain amount of risk-taking.  Without a net-
work of intellectual and policy entrepreneurs to 
champion ASEM, ASEM will not travel far as it 
continues to function at the lowest common de-
nominator with no vision and mission beyond 
meetings after meetings. 
 
                                                                               
countries can take the lead in different clusters of issues 
according to interests and expertise. 
 
3 See earlier commentary by Yeo Lay Hwee on 
“Transforming the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) into a 
Swinging, Eclectic Marketplace (Asem), July 2014. 




The Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM) launched in 
1996 has helped to build a bridge between the 
two regions (EU and East Asia) and has since 
broadened to encompass the two continents 
through its meetings and dialogue. However, the 
optimistic environment in which ASEM was borne 
is a far cry from the current environment fraught 
with tensions as powers big and small navigate 
an uncertain landscape towards a new world 
(dis)order.  
In a world where there is no single superpower to 
bring order to international politics, ASEM with its 
amorphous character and fluidity can continue to 
be relevant not only in building habits of dialogue 
through its various meeting, but could go further 
by becoming a marketplace of ideas and a useful 
platform to experiment with networked govern-
ance.  
Transforming ASEM from a series of meetings to 
a vibrant marketplace however is no easy task 
and requires “champions” to “push the button” 
and bring the ideas into fruition. As the ASEM 
Foreign Ministers meet in Luxembourg in Novem-
ber this year (2015) to prepare for ASEM’s 20th 
anniversary and 11th Summit in Ulan Bator in 
2016, it is time to reflect more critically on 
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